

CIVIL JUSTICE SKEWED

THE GROUPS AND THE BILLIONS SPENT ADVOCATING FOR “TORT REFORM”



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June 2026

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INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

Since its founding in 1998, the Center for Justice & Democracy has made an effort to monitor groups that lobby or otherwise advocate for “tort reform” laws.* Defined broadly, “tort reforms” are laws that take away people’s access to the civil courts or hinder the ability to hire an attorney when they have been harmed by corporate or professional misconduct, making it impossible for them to receive fair compensation and undermining the constitutional right to jury trial.

This study provides a comprehensive overview of the organizations currently working to limit the legal rights of injured parties, updating our prior research in a field that has expanded considerably in recent years. What distinguishes the current landscape from earlier periods is not simply the number of groups engaged in “tort reform” efforts but also the scale of financial resources behind them. Many organizations are spending millions of dollars annually, and some industries are operating at a level of expenditure that reaches into the billions of dollars each year.

Here we examine organized advocacy groups — primarily those operating as a 501(c)(6) typically representing an industry or profession, 501(c)(4) lobby groups and 501(c)(3) research and public educational entities¹ — as well as a few election-focused groups and private consulting firms. It is important to note that this report focuses solely on major national groups that are currently active on “tort reform” issues.² Some state groups are covered but only to the extent that they are part of a national network. In other words, this is not an exhaustive list; there are many more groups focused on civil liability, both at the national and state levels. In addition, since this study has an organizational focus, it necessarily understates the full financial weight behind “tort reform” efforts today. Individual corporations may also spend millions on lobbying, litigation support and political activity. While such spending is occasionally mentioned, the contributions of those companies generally fall outside the scope of this report.

The sheer amount of money being spent to undermine and weaken the civil justice system should shock anyone’s conscience. This is a system for which we fought the Revolutionary War and one the nation’s founders deliberately tried to safeguard in the Seventh Amendment and nearly every state constitution.³ The late conservative U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist called it “an important bulwark against tyranny and corruption.”⁴

As the nation approaches its 250th anniversary, it is important to understand what these groups are doing to this country. And it is equally important to recognize and appreciate those who, with far fewer resources, have honored the intent of our founders and continue fighting back.

* In this study, we put the words “tort reform” in quotes because the word “reform” is misleading. These laws are extremely harmful for everyday people.

DEDICATED “TORT REFORM” GROUPS

AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION (ATRA) AND STATE “TORT REFORM”

ATRA

This 501(c)(6) trade association⁵ was formed in 1986 at the very start of the modern “tort reform” movement to represent hundreds of U.S. and foreign corporations in their bid to overhaul civil liability laws. In his 1995 report for the Washington-based group Essential Information, John Gannon documented many of ATRA’s members that sponsored the organization, often through huge financial contributions.⁶ These were largely Fortune 500 companies with a direct financial stake in restricting lawsuits, including representatives of the tobacco, insurance, chemical, auto and pharmaceutical industries. Gannon found nearly 40 ATRA members were insurance companies or insurance-related organizations and six ATRA directors worked for insurance companies or law firms that frequently represent insurers.⁷ *Legal Times* also reported that “most of [ATRA’s] funding comes from large corporate donors.”⁸

In at least its first decade or so, the tobacco industry provided ATRA with significant support, directly through Philip Morris or indirectly through Covington & Burling, the corporate law firm for the Tobacco Institute and the major tobacco companies.⁹ For example, in 1995, the tobacco industry reportedly allocated close to \$5.5 million for ATRA, which accounted for more than half of ATRA’s then \$10.2 million budget.¹⁰

Today, ATRA’s board is still composed of leaders from major industries seeking legal immunity for wrongdoing, including pharmaceutical, oil and gas, asbestos, insurance, trucking, auto and ride-share companies.¹¹ However, the organization seems smaller than it once was. Public tax filings show that in 2024, it took in \$5,542,442 in total revenue while also distributing a chunk of that money — over \$1.6 million — to a new national 501(c)(4) “Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse” (CALA) organization called “Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse Inc.” (CALA Inc.) led by ATRA head Sherman “Tiger” Joyce. This amount constitutes most of CALA Inc.’s budget.¹²

ATRA also operates Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse Action, a PAC¹³ and/or 527 group¹⁴ that’s been active in recent elections. And in 1998, it created the American Tort Reform Foundation, a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt non-profit with a very small budget,¹⁵ the main purpose of which seems to be self-publishing a widely-debunked annual report called *Judicial Hellholes*, which is designed to discredit judges and juries willing to hold reckless corporations accountable for the harm they cause.¹⁶

STATE CALAS

While ATRA recently created a national CALA organization, its main work has focused largely on state “tort reform” efforts. CALA Inc.’s 2024 tax documents identify six states in particular: California, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Texas and West Virginia.¹⁷ But ATRA’s CALA work stems back to at least the early 1990s when it hired a public relations firm to help it achieve its state “tort reform” goals. The firm, a subsidiary of public relations titan Grey Advertising, was called APCO & Associates, a company that had specialized in “tort reform” lobbying since the 1980s and had worked for both insurance companies, like State Farm, and the tobacco industry.¹⁸

An internal Philip Morris report — made public with millions of other industry documents because of civil litigation — indicates that APCO and Neal Cohen, its “principal account executive on the [Philip Morris] PM Family Tort Project,” had been, since 1988, “assisting the PM Family [on] national and state tort coalitions and other ‘tort reform’ advocates with political, communications and grassroots strategies and related programs.”¹⁹ It was during these years that APCO and ATRA created CALA groups.²⁰

These groups have operated across the United States ever since under a variety of names, including “Stop Lawsuit Abuse” and “Lawsuit Abuse Watch,” with ties to various industries.²¹ With explicit ties to ATRA,²² CALAs have often relied on shared messaging, centralized strategic guidance and professionally developed media campaigns to influence both public opinion and state-level policymaking.²³

OTHER STATE “TORT REFORM” COALITIONS

There are additional formal advocacy groups focused on “tort reform” at the state level.²⁴ Such coalitions are structured on a state-by-state basis, often adopting names that reflect their jurisdiction, such as the Missouri Civil Justice Reform Coalition,²⁵ the Lawsuit Reform Alliance of New York²⁶ and Texans for Lawsuit Reform.²⁷

And new coalitions continue to emerge. For example, in 2025 a new state “tort reform” group began in Texas called the Lone Star Economic Alliance (LSEA), founded by Texans for Lawsuit Reform, the Texas Trucking Association and the Texas Food and Fuel Association.²⁸ The group has run targeted “tort reform” PR and ad campaigns.²⁹ LSEA members, totaling over 600 separate entities, include: insurance carriers, brokers and insurance-dedicated groups; trucking and transportation companies; energy, oil and gas and pipeline-related firms; consumer goods companies; chambers of commerce, regional business groups and trade associations; and “tort reform” groups.³⁰

U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM (ILR)

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a 501(c)(6) trade association, is the largest corporate lobby group in the nation.³¹ Its total 2024 revenue was enormous: more than \$225 million.³² The Chamber’s Board of Directors is composed overwhelmingly of chief executives, general counsel and senior leaders from major corporations and trade associations.³³

In 1998, the Chamber created a “tort reform” branch called the “Institute for Legal Reform” (ILR). Before it was legally folded back into the Chamber in 2020,³⁴ ILR had accumulated more than \$23 million in net assets and its own lobbying expenditures — even separate from the massive lobbying muscle of the Chamber itself — had become one of the largest in the nation, with over \$490.9 million spent on federal lobbying from 1999-2020.³⁵ Since then, from 2021-2025, the U.S. Chamber has spent more than \$356.6 million on federal lobbying by its own staff, an amount that includes lobbying on behalf of ILR.³⁶ And from 2000 to 2025 the Chamber spent over \$36.7 million on outside lobbyists who worked specifically on advancing ILR’s interests in Congress.³⁷

ILR produces research and reports supporting its “tort reform” agenda. Interestingly, after being folded back into the Chamber in 2020, it stopped producing its controversial state legal climate rankings that had sparked substantial criticism.³⁸ But issuing reports isn’t the only way the group has tried to influence public opinion. In the mid-2000s, ILR created a wire service called *Legal Newswire* and a network of state-based “Record” newspapers to breed fear, anger and contempt for victims and attorneys who sue in civil court.³⁹ Such publications exist in Illinois, Louisiana, California, Florida, West Virginia, Missouri and Pennsylvania.⁴⁰ (Notably, the live sites for these “news outlets” appear to no longer inform readers of the Chamber’s involvement.⁴¹)

While ILR and the Chamber fight to stop lawsuits against their own members for negligence and lawbreaking, they themselves are actually extremely litigious when it comes to trying to block courtroom access for everyone else.⁴² A 2024 Public Citizen analysis of 400 cases brought by the Chamber from January 2018 to July 2023 found that “the Chamber backed Fortune 500 litigants 35% of the time” and companies with “revenue of more than a billion dollars – an additional 20% of the time,” with “restricting access to the courts” being a “key issue.”⁴³

AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL (ALEC) CIVIL JUSTICE/JUDICIARY TASK FORCE

ALEC is a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt nonprofit⁴⁴ composed of conservative legislators who pay little to join and corporate representatives who pay hefty fees, allowing them to draft and shop model state bills without identifying that they’re written by national corporate lobbyists.⁴⁵ ALEC claims to have more than

2,000 members.⁴⁶ Its 21-member legislative board is all Republican lawmakers.⁴⁷ Its so-called “Private Enterprise Advisory Council” includes insurance, banking and pharmaceutical representatives.⁴⁸

One of ALEC’s key priorities has been limiting victims’ legal rights.⁴⁹ Indeed, for many years, ALEC had an entire division — its Civil Justice Task Force — devoted solely to weakening or eliminating corporate liability for wrongdoing. It was led by the late Victor Schwartz, general counsel of the American Tort Reform Association.⁵⁰ Notably, the Civil Justice Task Force has now been merged into a new “Judiciary Task Force” with the same “tort reform” priorities.⁵¹

To join ALEC, lawmakers pay a small \$100 per year membership fee.⁵² However, the vast majority of the organization’s \$10 million budget comes from contributions.⁵³ Corporations pay thousands of dollars in annual dues for access to conservative, industry-friendly lawmakers.⁵⁴ According to recent tax documents, ALEC paid more than a million dollars to reimburse lawmakers for travel and lodging expenses related to attending its conferences and meetings.⁵⁵

ALEC has always insisted it is not a lobby group. But in 2012, Common Cause filed a whistleblower complaint against ALEC calling for termination of its 501(c)(3) status, arguing that it’s “a corporate lobbying group masquerading as a public charity” which “spends its resources enabling its corporate members to communicate their desired legislative outcomes to state lawmakers” and “‘partner[s]’ with legislators to pass the so-called ‘free-enterprise’ corporate-drafted bills into law.”⁵⁶ Together with the Center for Media and Democracy, Common Cause subsequently filed supplemental documents with the IRS “demonstrating that ALEC operates much more like a corporate bill mill connecting corporate-friendly state legislators to lobbyists than it does a 501(c)(3) charitable organization.”⁵⁷

In the spring 2013 — seemingly in the wake of that first Common Cause complaint — ALEC set up a 501(c)(4) lobby organization called the Jeffersonian Project (now doing business as “ALEC Action”) with a much smaller budget.⁵⁸ In other words, most of the organization’s activities still appear to be conducted by ALEC’s 501(c)(3). Or as the Center for Media and Democracy put it, ALEC Action appears to be serving as a “‘shell game’ for ALEC while using its 501(c)(3) to serve as the nuts-and-bolts epicenter of its influence peddling machine.”⁵⁹

CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GROUP (CJRG)

One organization that operates more stealthily than the more “public-facing” anti-civil justice groups is CJRG. It was formally established in 2006 as a 501(c)(6) but it existed in prior years as an informal body often connected to the tobacco industry.⁶⁰ Its board, past and present, has consisted solely of corporate counsel and senior employees at major companies.⁶¹

The group operates as a strategic funder and “tort reform” agenda-setter by aggregating resources from its members and redistributing them across a web of other corporate-backed groups.⁶² Tax filings show numerous and substantial grants to national and state “tort reform organizations.”⁶³ ATRA has been by

far the biggest beneficiary of CJRG's largesse, receiving a total of \$24,224,594 in grant money from 2007-2024.⁶⁴

CJRG's funding sources and membership remain opaque. Internally, the group has no employees — it's structured around a "Managing Director";⁶⁵ a small board "which determines the projects/activities it will be funding;"⁶⁶ and member participants who "oversee the allocation and distribution of grant funds to ensure that the funding is utilized for purposes outlined by CJRG."⁶⁷

A list of CJRG's "tort reform" grantees can be found in the Appendix, "Civil Justice Reform Group: Reported Grants/Allocations."

RECENT UPSTARTS

PROTECTING AMERICAN CONSUMERS TOGETHER (PACT)

Launched in January 2025 with an initial \$10 million investment,⁶⁸ this 501(c)(4) group has used a coordinated PR strategy to push for "tort reform" on the state and federal levels,⁶⁹ spending millions of dollars on its efforts.⁷⁰ Waffle House, Uber and the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association⁷¹ are reportedly among the group's financial backers.⁷² Per an article excerpted and posted on PACT's website, Uber played an outsized role in at least one state — Georgia — financing PACT's "seven-figure advertising campaign" in 2025.⁷³

In February 2026, PACT had an inaugural "Lawsuit Abuse" summit featuring, among others, representatives from the American Trucking Associations⁷⁴ as well as leaders from Texans for Lawsuit Reform, the Florida Justice Reform Institute and the Lawsuit Reform Alliance of New York.⁷⁵

BUILDING AMERICA'S FUTURE (BAF)/ MAKE AMERICA AFFORDABLE AGAIN

BAF is a 501(c)(4) organization that runs a public-facing campaign called "Make America Affordable Again,"⁷⁶ attacking trial lawyers and pushing an unpopular "tort reform" called "loser pays"⁷⁷ in digital ads, as well as in TV ads running in a limited number of media markets including D.C. and West Palm Beach.⁷⁸ According to *Axios*, former top Trump campaign strategists Chris LaCivita and Tony Fabrizio lead this PR effort.⁷⁹

BAF's funding sources aren't fully transparent.⁸⁰ However, reporting has linked its funding to Elon Musk.⁸¹ In 2024 alone, the organization reported more than \$99.8 million in contributions, which accounted for nearly all of its revenue that year.⁸²

CITIZENS FOR AFFORDABLE RATES (CAR)

CAR is an independent expenditure committee registered in New York State and funded, it appears, entirely by Uber.⁸³ As of April 2026, Uber had poured \$8.3 million into it.⁸⁴ CAR used that money to wage a successful advertising and lobbying pressure campaign for “tort reform” in New York State’s budget bill that shifts costs away from the company and onto injured New Yorkers, while making it harder for people hurt in crashes to obtain meaningful recovery.⁸⁵

ALLIANCE FOR CONSUMERS (AFC)

AFC is a right-wing self-described nonprofit organization (it does not appear to be separately incorporated), which produces reports and media campaigns designed to undermine public confidence in large-scale consumer protection lawsuits and reshape the civil justice system in ways that favor corporate defendants.⁸⁶ Since 2020, it’s been led by O.H. Skinner,⁸⁷ the former Solicitor General of Arizona, with a particular focus on attacking pro-consumer state Attorneys General, especially those involved in class actions and other lawsuits on behalf of consumers in their states, as well as plaintiff firms.⁸⁸ Recently, AFC has targeted climate lawsuits brought by states against the fossil fuel industry.⁸⁹

The organization operates alongside a 501(c)(4) called the Alliance for Consumers Action Fund, which has been described as part of Leonard Leo’s “dark money network.”⁹⁰ Reporting shows that “Leo’s Concord Fund...registered the Alliance for Consumers Action Fund as a trade name on September 19 [in 2022], according to Virginia corporate records. The alliance announced its ad campaign targeting [Iowa Democratic Attorney General] Tom Miller ten days later.”⁹¹ Miller was defeated in that election.

CONSUMER CHOICE CENTER (CCC)

CCC is a far-right libertarian 501(c)(4) organization that operates globally.⁹² In the United States, it has pursued a multipronged communications strategy that promotes “tort reform.”⁹³

CCC states on its website that its support comes from corporations, individuals and foundations and that it operates a tiered membership model.⁹⁴ An archived webpage, from 2024, includes the same language but adds, “In the past and currently, we have received funding from multiple industries such as energy, fast moving consumer goods, nicotine, alcohol, airlines, agriculture, manufacturing, digital, healthcare, chemicals, banking, cryptocurrencies, and fin-tech.”⁹⁵ As for its global support, initial seed funding came from the group’s parent organization, Students for Liberty, which is a far-right organization with ties to and funding from the Koch brothers.⁹⁶

According to its most recent tax filings, CCC reported more than \$6.3 million in contributions in 2024, accounting for nearly all of the organization’s total revenue.⁹⁷

INSURANCE INDUSTRY ALLIES

CHUBB

Among property/casualty insurance industry executives, Chubb CEO Evan Greenberg is one of the most active “tort reform” proponents and leaders. In 2024, speaking at the Risk & Insurance Management Society’s annual conference in San Diego, Greenberg warned that corporations should prepare to fund sustained “tort reform” efforts: “It’s going to take money. It’s going to take talent. It’s going to have to be approached like a long-term political campaign.”⁹⁸

Evan’s recent activity and outspokenness are nothing new for him,⁹⁹ having been guided by his father Maurice “Hank” Greenberg, former Chairman and CEO of American International Group and legendary “tort reformer.”¹⁰⁰ (Hank was forced out of AIG in 2005 in response to fraud allegations.¹⁰¹) Unlike his father, who once admitted to an insurance audience that insurance industry actions were to blame for “all this hullabaloo’ about the tort system,”¹⁰² Evan has never been so introspective. He’s currently using vehicles like a *Wall Street Journal* op-ed¹⁰³ and Chubb’s annual shareholder letters to ferociously attack victims and their attorneys.¹⁰⁴

Chubb reports provide a window into how and where the insurer is spending its money.¹⁰⁵ The most recent data, from 2024, reveal the following donations to “tort reform” groups:

CHUBB: BACKING OF “TORT REFORM” GROUPS, 2024¹⁰⁶		
ORGANIZATION	PAYMENTS/DUES	LOBBYING ALLOCATION
U.S. Chamber of Commerce: Institute for Legal Reform	\$950,000	\$522,500
American Tort Reform Association**	\$200,000	\$35,000
Civil Justice Reform Group**	\$150,000	\$33,000
Georgians for Lawsuit Reform**	\$50,000	\$10,000
Illinois Coalition for Legal Reform**	\$40,000	\$25,200
Lawyers for Civil Justice**	\$35,000	\$3,500
New Jersey Civil Justice Institute**	\$30,000	\$13,500
Florida Justice Reform Institute Inc.	\$25,000	\$25,000
Lawsuit Reform Alliance of New York, Inc.	\$25,000	\$700
Pennsylvania Coalition of Civil Justice Reform**	\$20,000	\$5,000

The Committee for Florida Justice Reform PAC	\$25,000	
Civil Justice Association of California	\$10,000	
TOTAL	\$1,560,000	\$673,400

** "Payments also include 2025 dues paid in 2024."

INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE (TRIPLE-I or III)

Triple-I, a 501(c)(6), has long been a mouthpiece for the insurance industry’s “tort reform” agenda. As far back as the 1980s, the organization dumped \$6.5 million into advertising efforts designed to, in III’s words, “change the widely held perception that there is an insurance crisis to a perception of a lawsuit crisis.”¹⁰⁷ Insurance industry print ads started running in media outlets, with such misleading headlines as “Even Clergy Can’t Escape the Lawsuit Crisis,” among others. In 1986, U.S. Representative John LaFalce (D-NY) asked III to submit information to Congress to back up this ad and discovered “at the time that these ads were run, the insurance industry had not yet paid out one cent pursuant to any court judgment in any of these cases. Yet, they form an integral part of its national advertising campaign.”¹⁰⁸

Today, III has become an affiliate of The Institutes¹⁰⁹ and remains a leading public advocate for insurer-backed “tort reform.”¹¹⁰ Triple-I relies on program service revenue (over \$5.6 million in 2024, 95.7% of total revenue) from industry-linked activities.¹¹¹ As for its membership, III says it accounts for “nearly 50% of all U.S. property/casualty premiums written. Our members include mutual and stock companies, personal and commercial lines, primary insurers, and reinsurers – serving regional, national, and global markets.”¹¹²

AMERICAN PROPERTY CASUALTY INSURANCE ASSOCIATION (APCIA)

This 501(c)(6) trade association — representing home, auto and business insurers across over 300 member groups and more than 1,200 companies — maintains an extensive lobbying presence in state legislatures and on Capitol Hill, operates an active amicus and litigation program, tracks thousands of bills annually and plays a key role in PR campaigns to advance changes to the civil justice system.¹¹³ According to the most recent information available, in 2024 APCIA reported more than \$77.8 million in revenue, over \$67.3 million of which came from program service revenue.¹¹⁴

COALITION FOR LITIGATION JUSTICE (CLJ)

Founded by insurers in 2000, this 501(c)(6) organization is funded through dues from property and casualty insurers and reinsurers, who also make up its membership.¹¹⁵ The organization has filed hundreds of amicus briefs in appellate and state supreme court cases,¹¹⁶ on its own or in collaboration with other pro-“tort reform” corporate entities,¹¹⁷ using a litigation-centered strategy to influence how courts interpret liability, including how to apply legal standards to narrow the scope of liability in asbestos lawsuits.

LEGAL SYSTEM ABUSE COALITION

Formed in 2022 by Zurich North America, this is an alliance of insurers, brokers, businesses, trade associations and “tort reform” groups.¹¹⁸ Coalition members include ATRA, ILR and the American Property and Casualty Insurance Association. In addition, “Every major insurance carrier is involved. All the major corporate Fortune 100 companies are either aware of it, are working on it, or have joined.”¹¹⁹ As this group appears to be an informal network rather than a separately incorporated legal entity, there’s no publicly available information about the coalition’s funding, governance or budget. But it does host “symposiums” and takes credit for legislative activities.¹²⁰

MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY ASSOCIATION (MPL ASSOCIATION)

Formerly known as the Physician Insurers Association of America (PIAA), this 501(c)(6) trade group represents medical malpractice insurers in the United States.¹²¹ Its members are companies that insure physicians, hospitals and other health care providers against malpractice claims.¹²² The organization has long been a leading advocate for limiting legitimate medical malpractice lawsuits and compensation to injured patients, pushing “tort reform” through systematic legislative tracking, targeted lobbying support, national advocacy networks, coalitions with insurers and physician groups and other efforts.¹²³

While still known as PIAA, the group’s response to those who challenged it was sometimes bombastic. For example, in a 2000 press release, PIAA responded to a Public Citizen report it disliked with a stream of invectives, calling them “wolves in sheep’s clothing,” “nothing less than rabid,” “beyond the bounds of rationality and descended into the maelstrom of sheer lunacy” and “fighting to the death for the right to chase ambulances and hover over the sick and dead.”¹²⁴ Not to be left out, it labeled Citizens [sic, evidently meaning Center] for Justice and Democracy “paranoid.”¹²⁵

OTHER SPECIAL INTEREST ALLIES

Since the modern “tort reform” movement began in the 1980s, some corporate interests have used their money and influence to push for industry-specific laws that eliminate liability for harm they cause. Seeking such special treatment has been a common request at the state level, as illustrated by our satirical 2004 report, *The Center for Justice & Democracy’s First Annual Zany Immunity Law Awards*.¹²⁶ At the federal level, Congress has granted immunity to specific industries a number of times. Examples include: childhood vaccine makers in the 1980s;¹²⁷ the general aviation industry in the 1990s;¹²⁸ and gunmakers¹²⁹ and rental car companies¹³⁰ in the 2000s. As of publication, this strategy is being pursued by manufacturers of artificial stone slabs used in luxury countertops — the cutting of which is causing a silicosis epidemic among workers¹³¹ — as well as by ride-share companies like Uber¹³² and peer-to-peer car sharing platforms such as Turo, both of which are seeking the same kind of immunity previously granted to rental car companies.¹³³

But “tort reform” and immunity laws are not the only ways industries can escape accountability for their misconduct. Federal preemption can accomplish this as well. It occurs when Congress decides to occupy an area of law or regulation, which can invalidate conflicting or inconsistent state laws. Critically, federal preemption can also bar state tort lawsuits, effectively providing immunity for corporate wrongdoing. Indeed, requesting that Congress preempt a field has become a routine corporate lobbying strategy.

The following section provides numerous examples of industries and related organizations pursuing tort restrictions, immunity laws and/or federal preemption to accomplish their “tort reform” objectives.

AUTOMAKERS

State preemption of safety laws has been part of the automobile regulatory scheme since the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act was enacted in 1966.¹³⁴ However, preemption of state tort lawsuits has not. In fact, state tort litigation has always played a critical role in ensuring vehicle safety.¹³⁵ That doesn’t mean, however, that car companies won’t take advantage of any opportunity to convince courts to preempt such cases. The clearest example is a 2000 case where the U.S. Supreme Court sided with Honda, preempting a state tort lawsuit even though Congress had expressly made it clear that “compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard...does not exempt a person from liability at common law.”¹³⁶ That case telegraphed that, in order to preserve state tort remedies for auto crash victims, any new vehicle safety laws much contain precisely-worded preemption language.

Concerns about this have sharply intensified in recent years with the rise of autonomous vehicles (AVs) and Congress’ consideration of new federal legislation to regulate them. Indeed, most of the bills introduced to date lack the kind of specific language needed to ensure that state cases brought by those injured or killed in AV crashes are preserved.¹³⁷ Two trade associations, discussed below, are leading industry lobbying efforts.

ALLIANCE FOR AUTOMOTIVE INNOVATION

Formed in 2020, the Alliance serves as a major U.S. trade association and lobbying group for automakers, equipment suppliers, battery makers, semiconductor firms and AV companies.¹³⁸ CEO John Bozzella has testified before Congress on the importance of federal preemption.¹³⁹

The group's membership includes most major car makers and suppliers, such as General Motors, Ford, Toyota, Stellantis, Volkswagen, BMW, Hyundai, Honda, Nissan, Kia, Mazda, Subaru, Mercedes-Benz, Bosch, LG, Panasonic and Qualcomm, as well as several mobility-tech companies.¹⁴⁰ Senior executives from member automakers such as Honda, Hyundai, Ford and General Motors have served in board leadership roles.¹⁴¹

According to the most recent tax filings available, in 2024 the Alliance reported over \$29.6 million in revenue from program services, accounting for nearly 98% of its total revenue for that year.¹⁴² Available data also show that the Alliance spent more than \$7.8 million on federal lobbying in 2025.¹⁴³

AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION (AVIA)

Initially founded in 2016 as the Self-Driving Coalition for Safer Streets by Ford, Lyft, Uber, Volvo Cars and Waymo,¹⁴⁴ this trade association engages in lobbying, testimony and policy campaigns that promote industry-backed frameworks impacting AV liability.¹⁴⁵ Current membership includes leading AV-related technology, automotive, trucking, rideshare, logistics and transportation companies such as Amazon, DoorDash, FedEx, GM, Honda, Lyft, Rivian, Uber, UPS and Waymo.¹⁴⁶ The most recent available tax filings show that nearly 100% of AVIA's revenue comes from program services, totaling over \$1.9 million in 2024.¹⁴⁷ However, as with the tech industry generally, these numbers do not reflect how much individual companies may be spending on their own. (See Tech Industry.)

CRYPTO INDUSTRY

When it comes to the two most recent crypto industry regulatory/deregulatory bills to advance through one or both houses of Congress — the GENIUS Act, signed into law in 2025,¹⁴⁸ and the CLARITY Act, which as of publication has not yet passed the U.S. Senate¹⁴⁹ — “tort reform” may not be front and center for the industry. Weakened consumer protections, however, are.¹⁵⁰ And broad preemption can have a profound impact on victims' legal rights.¹⁵¹ This is particularly true of the CLARITY Act, which, if enacted in its current form, could significantly limit the ability of people harmed by fraud, market manipulation or crypto platform failures to hold those companies accountable in court.¹⁵²

Although some individual crypto companies, particularly Coinbase, spend more on federal lobbying than the industry's trade associations¹⁵³ (and are spending massive amounts on elections¹⁵⁴), the major trade associations remain key players in the industry's lobbying and advocacy efforts.¹⁵⁵

CRYPTO COUNCIL FOR INNOVATION (CCI)

Launched in 2021, CCI is a 501(c)(6) global trade association whose advocacy focuses in part on establishing federal crypto regulatory frameworks that could preempt state tort laws.^{156,157} Leading crypto companies Block, Coinbase, Kraken and Paxos are among its members.¹⁵⁸ According to the most recent tax filings available, CCI reported over \$5.3 million in revenue from program services in 2024, accounting for 91% of the group's total revenue for that year.¹⁵⁹ The organization's funding sources aren't fully transparent but public documents show that CCI received funds from the now-defunct Association for Digital Asset Markets Inc. (a private industry-led entity that represented firms operating in digital asset markets) when it shut down in 2025.¹⁶⁰ Since its founding, CCI has spent more than \$3.5 million on federal lobbying.¹⁶¹

BLOCKCHAIN ASSOCIATION

Through a multi-pronged strategy combining direct lobbying, legislative action and litigation — as well as activities intended to shape public perception of blockchain — this U.S.-based 501(c)(6) industry trade association has pushed for a national crypto regulatory framework that could override state tort laws.¹⁶² The Association's 100+ member list includes major crypto companies Coinbase and Kraken.¹⁶³ In terms of resources, the most recent available tax filings show that 91.7% of the group's total revenue came from contributions, which amounted to over \$6.5 million.¹⁶⁴ Though the Association's funding sources aren't completely public, tax documents reveal that it received \$150,000 in 2025 from the Association for Digital Asset Markets Inc. to “host a series of two mini policy summits throughout 2025, aimed at advancing the adoption of blockchain technology and shaping pro-innovation policies in the United States.”¹⁶⁵ In terms of federal lobbying activities, the Blockchain Association has spent over \$10.2 million to date since its formation in 2018.¹⁶⁶

THE DIGITAL CHAMBER (TDC)

Founded in 2014 and formerly known as the Chamber of Digital Commerce, this Washington, D.C.-based 501(c)(6) is the largest digital asset and blockchain trade association in the U.S.¹⁶⁷ Like the two entities discussed above, TDC advocates for federal regulatory frameworks that could preempt state tort laws, using lobbying, publications and other tools to champion its agenda.¹⁶⁸ Recent Advisory Board members include the CEOs of Binance, WisdomTree and Custodia Bank,¹⁶⁹ with membership spanning bitcoin miners, crypto exchanges, financial institutions and Fortune 500 companies.¹⁷⁰

According to the most recent tax filings available, TDC received over \$4.3 million in contributions in 2024, accounting for 95.6% of its total revenue for that year.¹⁷¹ Like CCI and the Blockchain Association, the organization's funding is opaque with one exception: a grant of \$150,000 from the dissolved Association for Digital Asset Markets Inc. in 2025 to “establish a state advocacy network to address the growing influence of state-level policymaking on the digital asset industry”¹⁷² and “address state proposals related to financial services, securities, tax, and consumer protection regulation.”¹⁷³ In terms

of federal advocacy, TDC has spent more than \$4.5 million lobbying lawmakers since 2017.¹⁷⁴ Among the issues recently lobbied on: the CLARITY and GENIUS Acts.¹⁷⁵

MEDICAL INDUSTRY

AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (AMA)

(See also, Insurance Industry Allies and Medical Professional Liability Association.)

For decades, the nation’s largest doctors’ association — which is one of the most powerful physician lobbying groups in the United States — has been a leading advocate for measures that restrict the legal rights of patients harmed by medical negligence.¹⁷⁶ As a 501(c)(6) organization, the AMA is well-resourced, spending over \$23.7 million on federal lobbying and generating over \$536 million in total revenue in 2025.¹⁷⁷

Although the AMA is closely identified with “tort reform” when it comes to limiting patients’ legal rights, the Association’s prioritizing of this issue ebbs and flows in sync with the insurance industry’s cyclical price-gouging of doctors.¹⁷⁸ For example, in 2020, the group’s top litigator failed to even mention juries or insurance rates in an interview about the “legal challenges” facing doctors and patients.¹⁷⁹ This stood in stark contrast to the AMA’s response to the 2002-2005 hard insurance market (*i.e.*, cyclically high premiums), when the Association embarked on a huge “tort reform” campaign around this issue, with its then President Richard Corlin claiming that limits on juries were needed because “[m]any practitioners, both generalists and specialists, just can’t afford the liability premiums, forcing them to retire early, limit their practice or relocate.”¹⁸⁰ At the same time, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) released a study, requested by three U.S. House committee chairs — all Republicans — ostensibly for the purpose of finding support for the AMA’s assertions that medical malpractice lawsuits had caused a widespread health care access “crisis” in this country.¹⁸¹ GAO found that the AMA was wrong: No such crisis existed. After receiving a draft of the GAO study, the Association asked GAO to “withhold release of the report” and tried to convince the agency to modify its findings.¹⁸² Instead, GAO came back and strongly reaffirmed its findings.

Notably, the group may be about to launch a new “tort reform” effort,¹⁸³ even though its own research shows that the majority of medical malpractice premiums charged to providers saw no increase in 2025.¹⁸⁴

MANUFACTURERS

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS (NAM)

NAM, a 501(c)(6) and the largest manufacturing trade group in the United States,¹⁸⁵ has a long history of working with major “tort reform” groups to push for laws to limit corporate liability for wrongdoing.¹⁸⁶ This is despite the fact that when NAM periodically surveys small, medium-sized and large businesses, respondents have never listed lawsuits among their most significant challenges.¹⁸⁷

NAM runs the Manufacturers’ Accountability Project (MAP),¹⁸⁸ an arm of NAM’s Legal Center that has “defended Exxon, BP, Shell, ConocoPhillips, Chevron, and others against lawsuits seeking to hold the oil and gas industry liable for deceiving the public about climate change and make it pay for damages associated with a warmer climate.”¹⁸⁹ In addition to litigating and filing briefs, MAP runs a PR campaign aimed at discrediting climate litigation.¹⁹⁰ Internal corporate records subpoenaed by Congress have tied some of MAP’s funding to the oil company BP.¹⁹¹

PRODUCT LIABILITY ADVISORY COUNCIL (PLAC)

Founded in the 1980s, this specialty 501(c)(6) association brings together corporate in-house lawyers, outside defense counsel and other product liability professionals who represent manufacturers and suppliers in the U.S. and abroad.¹⁹² Counsel for major companies such as Bayer, Beretta U.S.A., General Motors, Hyundai Motor America, OpenAI, Pfizer, Qualcomm Technologies, U-Haul International and Volkswagen Group of America are among those who have served on the group’s board.¹⁹³

In 2024, the group reported over \$1.9 million in revenue from program services, which accounted for nearly 100% of its total revenue that year.¹⁹⁴ PLAC’s current “tort reform”-related efforts include an MDL Task Force and filing amicus briefs in state and federal courts in major products liability and mass tort cases.¹⁹⁵

OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE (API)

This 501(c)(6) is the largest trade group representing companies across all sectors of the U.S. oil and natural gas industry.¹⁹⁶ API has been a leading opponent of climate liability litigation, working to defeat lawsuits seeking to hold fossil fuel companies accountable for climate-related harms.¹⁹⁷ In 2025, the organization spent over \$7.8 million lobbying federal lawmakers.¹⁹⁸ Among the issues lobbied on: “draft legislation related to state efforts to impose liability on the oil and gas industry” and “efforts related to addressing retroactive liability legislation at the state level.”¹⁹⁹

AMERICAN ENERGY INSTITUTE (AEI)

Founded and led by former Texas state legislator Jason Isaac,²⁰⁰ this 501(c)(3) fossil fuel advocacy group, formerly known as the Texas Natural Gas Foundation,²⁰¹ uses reports and campaigns to oppose climate litigation targeting the oil and gas industry.²⁰² Reporting has linked AEI to conservative megadonor Leonard Leo.²⁰³

AEI also has a trade organization arm called the American Energy Association, formed in 2024,²⁰⁴ whose corporate members include: Texas oil company CrownQuest; top fracking firm Liberty Energy; Ohio oil and gas well driller/pumper Summit Petroleum; and frac sand miner/hauler Atlas Energy Solutions.²⁰⁵ According to the most recent tax filings available, 100% of AEI's 2024 revenue came from contributions,²⁰⁶ the same was true regarding the American Energy Association.²⁰⁷

PESTICIDE MANUFACTURERS

MODERN AG ALLIANCE (MAA)

In 1974, Monsanto began selling Roundup, a weedkiller whose main active ingredient is glyphosate,²⁰⁸ an extremely toxic herbicide.²⁰⁹ The company knew as far back as the 1980s that Roundup and glyphosate were likely carcinogenic to humans.²¹⁰ Not only did Monsanto tell no one, it actively tried to conceal the link.²¹¹ By the time Roundup was purchased in 2018 by German pharmaceutical and biotech giant Bayer, thousands of sick and dying Roundup customers had sued.²¹² Bayer is now asking the U.S. Supreme Court to effectively end all future state court litigation entirely.²¹³ However, the company is not waiting on the U.S. Supreme Court. Far from it. Bayer has become the dominant force behind the spread of pesticide immunity bills in Congress and the states.²¹⁴

Bayer operates largely through the Modern Ag Alliance (MAA),²¹⁵ a 501(c)(4) nonprofit that the company launched in 2024.²¹⁶ In 2024, MAA reported over \$15.6 million in revenue,²¹⁷ more than \$13 million of which was paid to a single PR firm (Penta Group), which reportedly also works for Bayer.²¹⁸

CROPLIFE AMERICA

MAA is not the only organization lobbying for these "tort reform" bills. CropLife America, a 501(c)(4) entity with global ties to Bayer and other chemical giants around the globe,²¹⁹ is a dominant force behind pesticide immunity legislation. In 2025, the group spent over \$2.6 million on federal lobbying,²²⁰ with the agribusiness sector as a whole spending more than \$223.6 million on lobbying that same year.²²¹ According to the most recent tax filings available, in 2024, CropLife America spent more than \$1 million paying PR firms²²² and also made grants to numerous organizations around the country to "support pesticide advocacy."²²³

“SMALL” BUSINESS SECTOR

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS (NFIB)

NFIB is a 501(c)(6) trade association²²⁴ with affiliates in all 50 states and Washington, D.C. that purports to represent small businesses. However, the group, which took in nearly \$116 million in 2024,²²⁵ has long been criticized for partisan (Republican) lobbying on issues that favor large corporate interests and run counter to the interests of small businesses.²²⁶ That includes “tort reform,”²²⁷ an issue that NFIB small business members have repeatedly ranked as an issue of less importance than almost any issue they could possibly have, or on which they want lawmakers to focus.²²⁸

As with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, NFIB has a litigation department that sues to block access to the courts for everyday people,²²⁹ even though such lawsuits can provide the only way for some small businesses to recover money as a result of illegal corporate misconduct targeting them.²³⁰ For example, in 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld American Express’ use of a forced arbitration clause and class action waiver in its merchant agreements, preventing a small Italian restaurant from litigating its case.²³¹ Rather than working to undo this decision or acknowledging that small businesses are often plaintiffs in cases, NFIB’s representatives went to Congress to attack “plaintiff attorneys,” their “outlandish claims” and their “perverse incentive to threaten or initiate a legal action.”²³²

TECH INDUSTRY

When it comes to this sector’s most important liability issues — preserving Section 230 immunity²³³ and preempting state laws and remedies connected to kids’ safety and AI²³⁴ — massive lobbying by individual tech companies has dwarfed any trade association expenditures. A 2025 Public Citizen analysis of “[c]orporations categorized by OpenSecrets.org as electronics businesses, including Apple, Nvidia, and OpenAI, collectively spent \$226 million lobbying the federal government during the first three quarters of 2025” with a “combined \$314 million in lobbying spending by technology sector corporations.”²³⁵ Adding in spending during and since the 2024 elections, Public Citizen found that “Big Tech has so far spent more than \$1.1 billion to distort federal policy to prioritize the industry’s profits over protecting the public.”²³⁶ And this spending is only continuing.²³⁷ The trade groups that represent Big Tech spend less and seem to function more as litigation, coalition and messaging help for the industry.

COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION (CCIA)

This international 501(c)(6) trade association represents companies in the computer, internet, information technology and telecommunications sectors.²³⁸ Through lobbying, reports and amicus

briefs, CCIA has pushed back against proposals that would narrow Section 230 and preserve state laws and remedies for parents.²³⁹

Association membership includes infrastructure and software companies, consumer-facing digital-service companies and big tech firms like Amazon, Apple and Google who also have representation on CCIA's current 9-person board.²⁴⁰ According to the most recent tax filings available, notable revenue in 2024 included over \$19.3 million in contributions to CCIA, accounting for 80.9% of total revenue that year.²⁴¹ However, its lobbying expenditures are typically under \$500,000, totaling \$330,000 in 2025.²⁴²

NETCHOICE

Launched in 2001, this technology industry trade association represents major internet, e-commerce and social media companies including Amazon, Google, Meta, OpenAI, TikTok and YouTube.²⁴³ Nearly all of its revenue comes from contributions, totaling over \$22.1 million in 2024, a 45% increase from the previous year.²⁴⁴ NetChoice has an active litigation center²⁴⁵ and has taken strong positions in defense of Section 230.²⁴⁶ But its federal lobbying presence is comparatively small, spending \$290,000 in 2025.²⁴⁷

TECHNET

Based in Washington, D.C. with satellite offices around the country, this national trade group represents technology CEOs and senior executives, providing members with federal and state-level advocacy, lobbying, communications support and direct access to policymakers.²⁴⁸ TechNet has served as a tech-industry voice defending Section 230 immunity from proposals that would condition, limit or sunset it.²⁴⁹ It has also been active in advocating for preemption of state laws and remedies.²⁵⁰

In terms of governance, the group's current 10-member Executive Council includes senior leadership from Amazon, Google and Intuit.²⁵¹ As for TechNet's membership, its list reflects a coalition of many of the largest and most influential technology, internet, AI, telecommunications, venture capital and platform-based companies in the United States, representing a broad cross-section of the modern digital economy.²⁵²

Available tax filings show over \$15.1 million in revenue from program services in 2024, accounting for 95.9% of TechNet's total revenue that year.²⁵³ In 2025, its federal lobbying expenditures were close to \$2 million,²⁵⁴ slightly more than other trade associations but still overshadowed by lobbying outlays from the tech companies themselves.

TRUCKING INDUSTRY

Crashes involving trucks weighing more than 10,000 pounds (large trucks) are far too frequent, horrific and costly.²⁵⁵ The trucking industry's success at blocking federal regulatory safety and enforcement advancements is well-documented.²⁵⁶ As Jackie Gillan, veteran safety advocate and President Emerita of Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, put it, "It's been a constant battle of the trucking industry against even the weakest safety standards."²⁵⁷ But a weak regulatory structure is not the industry's only priority. Federal and state "tort reform" — making it more difficult or impossible for cases involving deaths or horrific truck crash injuries to go forward — is also a major goal.

AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS (ATA)

This 501(c)(6) trade association is the largest entity representing the trucking industry in Washington, D.C. and an advocate for big U.S. trucking companies.²⁵⁸ One of its major legislative priorities is "tort reform," particularly attacking jury verdicts won by victims hurt or killed in horrendous truck crashes.²⁵⁹ The organization, with a total budget of around \$50 million in 2024,²⁶⁰ spent \$2.8 million on lobbying that year,²⁶¹ followed by more than \$2.6 million in lobbying expenditures in 2025.²⁶²

OWNER-OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION (OOIDA)

The trucking sector also benefits from the lobbying efforts of OOIDA, a 501(c)(6) representing small business truckers that spent more than \$6.8 million on federal lobbying over the past five years (2021-2025).²⁶³ In addition, OOIDA uses its *Land Line* magazine to amplify and champion the greater trucking industry's "tort reform" agenda.²⁶⁴ And as noted earlier, OOIDA is reportedly among the financial backers of Protecting American Consumers Together (PACT), a 501(c)(4) group that is pushing for "tort reform" on the state and federal levels.²⁶⁵

In terms of OOIDA's finances, the most recent tax filings available show that the majority (77%) of its 2024 total revenue came from contributions and investment income (together equaling almost \$2 million), while its net assets amounted to over \$137.8 million that year.²⁶⁶

TRANSPORTATION INTERMEDIARIES ASSOCIATION (TIA)

This 40+ year old 501(c)(6) represents over 1,800 third party logistics companies, which serve as intermediaries that arrange for transportation of goods between shippers and truckers.²⁶⁷ In terms of "tort reform" efforts, TIA has advocated for immunity for broker/shipper companies that negligently hire unsafe trucking companies that cause crashes, filing an amicus brief in a recent U.S. Supreme Court case and signaling that, if the industry lost, TIA might pressure Congress to change the law.²⁶⁸ On May 14, 2026, the Court unanimously rejected the industry's position.²⁶⁹

Available tax filings reflect TIA collecting more than \$7.1 million in revenue from program services in 2024; this accounted for 92.7% of the group’s total revenue for the year.²⁷⁰ Public documents also show that the organization has spent more than \$2.5 million on federal lobbying over the past five years (2021-2025).²⁷¹

AMERICAN TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH INSTITUTE (ATRI)

ATRI, a 501(c)(3), is the trucking industry’s research arm.²⁷² Its work on jury verdicts and trucking litigation is often used to support the industry’s push for “tort reform.”²⁷³ To do its work, ATRI relies on millions in contributions.²⁷⁴ Donors include major carriers and industry associations,²⁷⁵ with board and Research Advisory Committee members coming from these two groups.²⁷⁶

Interestingly, while ATRI’s reports tend to conclude that victims, plaintiff lawyers and juries are to blame for the industry’s woes (*i.e.*, not truck crashes), it has also made some fairly embarrassing admissions, including that industry lawyers believe that they are not very good.²⁷⁷ According to a survey of both plaintiff and defense lawyers, “73.3 percent said that plaintiff attorneys were doing better, 20.0 percent said both, 6.7 percent said neither, with no one saying defense attorneys did better.”²⁷⁸ Attorneys also told ATRI that when it comes to large verdicts, crash avoidance is the best solution. More specifically, “Interviewees generally concurred that the more safety activities motor carriers engaged in to prevent crashes the lower the likelihood that a nuclear verdict would result. It was also commonly noted that motor carriers typically do not allocate enough resources toward safety and crash prevention.”²⁷⁹

CORPORATE DEFENSE BAR GROUPS AND LITIGATORS

(See *also*, Civil Justice Reform Group and Product Liability Advisory Council.)

LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE (LCJ)

Founded in 1987, LCJ is the self-described voice of the defense bar on federal procedural rules, targeting the U.S. Judicial Conference rulemaking process where technical changes to civil procedure rules can greatly affect ordinary people’s ability to seek justice and accountability for corporate harm and

misconduct.²⁸⁰ Organized as a 501(c)(6) trade association,²⁸¹ the group is supported by dues and contributions from corporations, law firms and allied defense organizations.²⁸²

Public filings show that LCJ reported nearly \$2.2 million in revenue in 2024.²⁸³ Its leadership includes attorneys from major corporations and top defense firms.²⁸⁴

DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (DRI)

DRI, a 501(c)(6) organization,²⁸⁵ is a major membership association of civil defense lawyers and in-house counsel, representing attorneys who defend businesses and individuals in tort and other civil litigation.²⁸⁶ It advances corporate defense and “tort reform” objectives through committees, task forces, working groups, amicus filings, publications, seminars, conferences and other means.²⁸⁷ The organization’s primary source of revenue comes from program services, totaling more than \$10.5 million in 2024 based on the most recent tax filings available.²⁸⁸

WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION (WLF)

Founded in 1977 by former Nixon staffer and conservative activist Daniel Popeo to take on the “Ralph Naders...of this world,”²⁸⁹ WLF has been a longstanding “tort reform” advocate. For example, beginning in the late 1990s, this 501(c)(3) group²⁹⁰ placed several high-priced advertisements on the *New York Times* op-ed page;²⁹¹ they were meant to resemble op-ed columns, attacking trial lawyers and lawsuits. CJ&D asked the *Times* to cease publication of these advertisements when they first appeared and requested that our organization be permitted to respond with a “letter to the editor.”²⁹² The paper refused.

WLF typically uses litigation, amicus briefs and legal commentary in its quest to shield corporations and others from liability exposure.²⁹³ As of publication, members of WLF’s Legal Policy Advisory Board include counsel from Chevron, GlaxoSmithKline, Hyundai Motor America, Roche Diagnostics and State Farm plus attorneys from major defense firms.²⁹⁴ WLF annual reports from the past five years show that leading corporate and defense counsel have consistently served on this Board.²⁹⁵

These annual reports also show that corporations have accounted for the majority of WLF’s financial contributors, most recently 87% in 2025.²⁹⁶ Though the organization doesn’t disclose specific donors, available tax filings from the Civil Justice Reform Group reveal thousands in annual grants to WLF from 2015-2024.²⁹⁷

“RESEARCH” GROUPS

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (AEI)

AEI is a major, industry-connected 501(c)(3) “think tank” that has used publications, events and commentary to amplify arguments for tort reform.²⁹⁸ While AEI has long been involved in “tort reform” issues,²⁹⁹ it appears to have been most actively involved in tort and liability issues in the early 2000s³⁰⁰ when it created its AEI Liability Project run by conservative legal activist Ted Frank. He later became Director of the AEI Legal Center for the Public Interest.³⁰¹ That project now appears defunct and Frank has since moved on.³⁰²

However, some AEI anti-civil justice activities have continued.³⁰³ Today, publicly available information shows that the organization has received millions of dollars in funding from corporations.³⁰⁴ In terms of governance, AEI’s Board of Trustees is comprised of business and financial executives.³⁰⁵

Paradoxically, AEI’s researchers have occasionally — and possibly inadvertently — exposed the dangers of some “tort reforms.” A 2003 report co-authored by then AEI Liability Project Associate Director Jonathan Klick found that repealing the collateral source rule, a common “tort reform,” leads to an increase in infant mortality.³⁰⁶ And in 2005, AEI published a book supporting the contingency fee system for plaintiff lawyers, writing, “A second advantage of contingent fees [the first being cost reduction] is improved access to the legal system.”³⁰⁷

GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY (GMU)

The university’s Law & Economics Center (LEC) at Antonin Scalia Law School promotes “tort reform” through research and policy analysis³⁰⁸ as well as its Judicial Education Program, which provides seminars, conferences and courses for state and federal judges.³⁰⁹ (Note that LEC’s programs often allow at least one individual with a differing viewpoint to participate as well.) In 2011, it created its Civil Justice Academy “for the benefit of Members of the U.S. Congress, their staffs, and their constituents, as well as for state legislators and their staff, state and federal judges, state attorneys general and the attorneys in their offices, academics, agency officials, and think tank researchers.”³¹⁰ Reporting at the time linked this group and its mission to its large corporate funders that benefitted from “tort reform.”³¹¹

Today, LEC is funded in part by Exxon, GlaxoSmithKline, Johnson & Johnson, Merck and State Farm as well as the U.S. Chamber and the Civil Justice Reform Group, both discussed earlier.³¹² According to available tax filings, LEC and GMU’s Foundation received a total of over \$1.2 million from CJRG for “Public and Judicial Education,” “Expert Evidence (Sound Science) Project,” “Medicare Secondary Payer Project” and general “Program Support” from 2009-2024.³¹³

PERRYMAN GROUP

This private economic consulting business is the main source of customized studies for “tort reform” groups, insurance interests and business coalitions to justify and amplify their attacks on the civil justice system.³¹⁴ Perryman often produces “reports” using the same types of suspect methodology used by other “tort reform” groups.³¹⁵

Perryman’s conclusions appear client-driven. For example, a 2004 Perryman study on the economic impact of casinos in Texas, paid for by “wealthy potential casino investors,” was blasted by independent researchers such as John Kindt, professor of business and legal policy at the University of Illinois, who said the Perryman report was “the wrong study with the wrong numbers that reached the wrong conclusions.”³¹⁶ Perryman responded, “Never in 25 years have we cooked the numbers.”³¹⁷ However, in 1995, its President and CEO Ray Perryman was called “the most bought economist in Texas” and is known to “produce any conclusion you want.”³¹⁸

MARATHON STRATEGIES

Marathon Strategies is a corporate consulting firm that seems to have crossed over into “tort reform” territory in 2023, publishing the first of what has become an annual jury-grievance, “thermo-nuclear verdicts” report. Marathon tries to amplify its annual reports across the corporate-defense, insurance and “tort reform” media.³¹⁹ While Marathon presents this work as independent, a quick review of its 2023 report³²⁰ shows a remarkable number of references (more than two dozen) to the work of other “tort reform” groups that produce similar content: the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, the American Tort Reform Association and even an insurance defense firm, Tyson & Mendes, which markets itself to defense-side lawyers and insurance professionals as focused on what it calls “nuclear verdicts.”³²¹ Later reports have been sanitized of these references.³²²

The 2025 report’s website ends with the following pitch to potential clients: “Defendants can’t afford to treat these lawsuits as isolated legal matters – the reputational and financial stakes are simply too high. Companies need to be thinking about how they communicate before, during, and after trial – because the court of public opinion doesn’t wait for a verdict. Whether you’re managing risk, building a defense, or preparing your next board briefing, this report gives you a critical edge” and “Talk to Our Team.”³²³

Notably in 2024, the Marathon “Team” actually reached out to the Center for Justice & Democracy, saying they wanted to “connect” to discuss the big verdicts they found. We tried to set up a meeting. We never heard from them again.

APPENDIX

**CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GROUP:
FORM 990 REPORTED GRANTS/ALLOCATIONS, 2007³²⁴
(Total \$3,309,492)**

RECIPIENT	SPECIFIED PURPOSE	AMOUNT
Abbott, Simses & Kuchler	"Louisiana – Research Project"	\$20,000
American Legislative Exchange Council	"Program Support"	\$28,000
American Tort Reform Association	"State Reform Support," "State AG Lawsuits Project," "Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation Research," "Program Support"	\$1,246,200 \$150,000 \$17,500 \$190,000
Associated Industries of Massachusetts	"Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation Research"	\$10,000
Brookings Institution	"Public & Judicial Education/Media," "Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation Research"	\$10,000 \$25,000
Brown Communications, LLC	"West Virginia Program Support"	\$63,800
Charles G. Koch Charitable Foundation	"Expert Evidence Research Project"	\$33,503
Civil Justice Association of California	"California Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$185,000
Colorado Civil Justice League	"2007 CJRG Grant"	\$50,000
Dutko Poole McKinley, LLC	"Florida Civil Justice Reform"	\$60,000
Fearington Smith & Ralston	"Expert Evidence Research Project"	\$16,000
Federalist Society	"Public & Judicial Education/Media"	\$15,000
Florida Justice Reform Institute	"Florida Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$100,000
Gamble & Schlemeir, Ltd	"Expert Evidence Research Project"	\$30,000
Heritage Foundation	"Overcriminalization Research Project"	\$42,000
Illinois Chamber of Commerce	"Civil Justice Reform Event"	\$15,000
Illinois Civil Justice League	"Illinois Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$145,000
Irwin Fritchie Urquhart & Moore LLC	"Louisiana Legislative Research Project"	\$20,000
Judicial Evaluation Institute for Economic Issues	"Program Support"	\$90,000
Lawyers for Civil Justice	"Electronic Discovery Research Project," "Expert Evidence Research Project"	\$75,405 \$60,000
Lemle & Kelleher, L.L.P.	"Louisiana Legislative Research Project"	\$20,000
Louisiana Assn. of Business and Industry	"Support for CJ Task Force"	\$50,000
Mississippi BIPEC	"2007 Contribution for Research & Education"	\$15,000
Mississippians for Economic Progress	"State AG Lawsuit Research"	\$10,000
M-LAW	"Government Standards Defense Project"	\$25,000
Montgomery McGraw Collins & Rand, LLC	"Mississippi Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$35,040
Moore & Van Allen	"Expert Evidence Research Project"	\$854
National Judicial College	"Public & Judicial Education/Media"	\$5,000
NFJE	"Public & Judicial Education/Media"	\$10,000
Northwestern University School of Law	"Expert Evidence Research Project"	\$25,583
Ohio Alliance for Civil Justice	"Ohio Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$25,000
PHARMA	"False Claims Act Research"	\$65,000

RAND Institute for Civil Justice	"Electronic Discovery Research Project"	\$15,000
Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP	"Expert Evidence Research Project," "Government Standards Defense Project," "Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation Research"	\$19,060 \$75,841 \$7,706
Texas Civil Justice League	"Texans for Lawsuit Reform 2007"	\$100,000
Texans for Lawsuit Reform	"Texas Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$100,000
U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform	"Overcriminalization Research Project"	\$8,000

**CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GROUP:
FORM 990 REPORTED GRANTS/ALLOCATIONS, 2008³²⁵
(Total \$3,673,250)**

RECIPIENT	SPECIFIED PURPOSE	AMOUNT
Abbott Simses & Kuchler	"Louisiana – Research Project"	\$30,000
Alabama Civil Justice Reform	"Program Support (ACJRC)"	\$75,000
American Legislative Exchange Council	"Program Support"	\$48,000
American Tort Reform Association	"Amicus Brief Program," "Program Support," "State AG Lawsuits Project," "State AG Lawsuit Research," "Alabama Civil Justice Reform Support," "California Civil Justice Reform Support," "Florida Civil Justice Reform Support," "Illinois Civil Justice Reform Support," "Louisiana Civil Justice Reform Support," "Mississippi Civil Justice Reform Support," "Texas Civil Justice Reform Support," "West Virginia Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$45,000 \$230,000 \$179,000 \$5,000 \$88,000 \$325,000 \$157,000 \$140,000 \$100,000 \$192,500 \$100,000 \$500,000
Associated Industries of Massachusetts	"Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation Research"	\$5,000
Civil Justice Association of California	"Program Support"	\$200,000
Coalition for Common Sense	"Louisiana Civil Justice Reform Support," "Program Support"	\$100,000
Colorado Civil Justice League	"Colorado Civil Justice Reform Support," "2008 Contribution for Research and Education"	\$50,000
Federalist Society	"State Courts Project – Legal Reform"	\$25,000
Florida Justice Reform Institute	"Florida Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$75,000
Illinois Chamber of Commerce	"Civil Justice Reform Event"	\$20,000
Illinois Civil Justice League	"Illinois Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$185,000
Judicial Evaluation Institute for Economic Issues	"Program Support"	\$75,000
Lawyers for Civil Justice	"Expert Evidence Research Project"	\$28,750
Lemle & Kelleher, LLP	"Louisiana Legislative Research Project"	\$20,000
Mississippi BIPEC	"2008 Contribution for Research and Education"	\$20,000
Mississippians for Economic Progress	"Program Support"	\$10,000
M-LAW	"Govt. Standards Defense Project"	\$45,000
National Judicial College	"Scientific Evidence Distance Learning"	\$35,000
NFJE	"Public & Judicial Education/Media"	\$20,000

NJ Lawsuit Reform Alliance	"New Jersey Civil Justice Reform Support," "Appeal Bond Cap Support"	\$103,000 \$72,000
Northwestern University School of Law	"Expert Evidence Research Project"	\$85,000
PHARMA	"False Claims Act Research"	\$60,000
South Carolina Civil Justice Coalition	"South Carolina Program Support"	\$25,000
Texas Civil Justice League	"Texas Program Support"	\$200,000

**CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GROUP:
FORM 990 REPORTED GRANTS/ALLOCATIONS, 2009³²⁶
(Total \$3,204,500)**

RECIPIENT	SPECIFIED PURPOSE	AMOUNT
American Legislative Exchange Council	"Program Support"	\$10,000
American Tort Reform Association	"Unfair & Deceptive Trade Practices Project," "State Attorney General Project," "Program Support," "Alabama Grassroots," "California Grassroots," "Florida Grassroots," "Illinois Grassroots," "Louisiana Grassroots," "Mississippi Grassroots," "Texas Grassroots," "West Virginia Grassroots"	\$40,000 \$180,000 \$190,000 \$85,000 \$325,000 \$75,000 \$140,000 \$100,000 \$50,000 \$100,000 \$360,000
Civil Justice Association of California	"California Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$200,000
Coalition for Common Sense	"Louisiana Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$55,000
Colorado Civil Justice League	"Colorado Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$60,000
Federalist Society	"State Courts Project"	\$25,000
Florida Justice Reform Institute	"Florida Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$100,000
George Mason University Law & Economic Center	"Public and Judicial Education"	\$10,000
Illinois Civil Justice League	"Illinois Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$210,000
Judicial Evaluation Institute for Economic Issues	"Program Support"	\$25,000
Louisiana Association of Business and Industry	"Louisiana Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$25,000
Michigan Chamber of Commerce	"Program Support"	\$25,000
Michigan Lawsuit Abuse Watch	"Govt. Standards Defense Project"	\$30,000
National Foundation for Judicial Excellence	"Scientific Evidence Project"	\$15,000
National Judicial College	"Public & Judicial Education"	\$20,000
New Jersey Lawsuit Reform Alliance	"New Jersey Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$200,000
New Jersey Society of CPAs	"Appeal Bonds Project"	\$9,500
Northwestern University School of Law	"Federal Rules/Expert Evidence Projects"	\$165,000
NY TortReformNow.org, Inc.	"Electronic Discovery Project"	\$15,000
PHARMA	"False Claims Act Project"	\$70,000
RAND Institute for Civil Justice	"Program Support"	\$15,000
South Carolina Civil Justice Coalition	"South Carolina Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$25,000
Texans for Lawsuit Reform	"Texas Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$100,000
Texas Civil Justice League	"Texas Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$100,000

Wisconsin Civil Justice Council	"Wisconsin Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$50,000
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**CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GROUP:
FORM 990 REPORTED GRANTS/ALLOCATIONS, 2010³²⁷
(Total \$2,208,900)**

RECIPIENT	SPECIFIED PURPOSE	AMOUNT
Alabama Civil Justice Reform Committee	"Expert Evidence (Sound Science)"	\$20,000
American Legislative Exchange Council	"Program Support"	\$15,000
American Tort Reform Association	"Program Support," "Alabama Grassroots," "California Grassroots," "Illinois Grassroots," "Louisiana Grassroots," "Texas Grassroots," "West Virginia Grassroots," "State Attorney General Project"	\$283,900 \$79,000 \$167,000 \$77,250 \$100,750 \$50,000 \$200,000 \$134,000
Civil Justice Association of California	"California Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$167,000
Coalition for Common Sense	"Louisiana Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$50,000
Colorado Civil Justice League	"Colorado Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$24,000
Federalist Society	"State Courts Project"	\$10,000
Florida Justice Reform Institute	"Florida Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$75,000
George Mason University Law & Economics Center	"Public and Judicial Education"	\$214,000
Illinois Civil Justice League	"Illinois Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$140,000
Lawsuit Reform Alliance of New York	"Expert Evidence (Sound Science)"	\$18,000
Louisiana Association of Business and Industry	"Louisiana Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$20,000
Michigan Chamber of Commerce	"Michigan Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$30,000
National Judicial College	"Scientific Evidence Project"	\$35,000
New Jersey Lawsuit Reform Alliance	"New Jersey Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$120,000
South Carolina Civil Justice Coalition	"South Carolina Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$29,000
Texans for Lawsuit Reform	"Texas Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$75,000
Texas Civil Justice League	"Texas Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$75,000

**CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GROUP:
FORM 990 REPORTED GRANTS/ALLOCATIONS, 2011³²⁸
(Total \$2,743,051)**

RECIPIENT	SPECIFIED PURPOSE	AMOUNT
American Legislative Exchange Council	"Wrongful Death/Non-Economic Damages Project"	\$25,000
American Tort Reform Association	"Program Support," "Appeal Bond Expense Cap Project," "Expert Evidence (Sound Science) Project," "State Attorney General Lawsuits Project," "Mass Tort	\$190,000 \$80,000 \$36,078

	Project," "Alabama Grassroots," "California Grassroots," "Florida Grassroots," "Illinois Grassroots," "Louisiana Grassroots," "Pennsylvania Grassroots," "Texas Grassroots," "West Virginia Grassroots"	\$144,000 \$125,000 \$40,125 \$167,000 \$65,000 \$103,000 \$100,000 \$5,000 \$100,000 \$375,000
Business Council of Alabama	"Alabama Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$75,000
Citizens to Protect Pennsylvania	"Pennsylvania Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$20,000
Civil Justice Association of California	"California Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$167,000
Coalition for Common Sense	"Louisiana Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$50,000
Colorado Civil Justice League	"Colorado Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$40,000
Federalist Society	"State Courts Project"	\$2,166
Florida Justice Reform Institute	"Florida Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$75,000
George Mason University Law & Economics Center	"Expert Evidence (Sound Science) Project," "Medicare Secondary Payer Project"	\$55,000 \$32,000
Illinois Civil Justice League	"Illinois Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$140,000
Louisiana Association of Business and Industry	"Louisiana Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$25,000
National Judicial College	"Expert Evidence (Sound Science) Project"	\$10,000
New Jersey Lawsuit Reform Alliance	"New Jersey Civil Justice Reform Support," "Appeal Bond Expense Cap Project"	\$95,925 \$30,000
North Carolina Chamber	"Wrongful Death/Non-Economic Damages Project"	\$20,000
Pennsylvania Business Council	"Pennsylvania Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$60,216
South Carolina Civil Justice Coalition	"South Carolina Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$47,000
Texans for Lawsuit Reform	"Texas Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$100,000
Texas Civil Justice League	"Texas Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$100,000
Utah Civil Justice League	"State Attorney General Lawsuits Project"	\$10,000
Wisconsin Civil Justice Council	"Wisconsin Civil Justice Reform Support"	\$33,541

**CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GROUP:
FORM 990 REPORTED GRANTS/ALLOCATIONS, 2012³²⁹
(Total \$2,990,226)**

RECIPIENT	SPECIFIED PURPOSE	AMOUNT
Alabama Civil Justice Reform Committee	"Program Support"	\$35,000
American Legislative Exchange Council	"Program Support"	\$30,000
American Tort Reform Association	"Program Support"	\$1,584,791
Business Council of Alabama	"Program Support"	\$35,000
Civil Justice Association of California	"Program Support"	\$175,000
Coalition for Common Sense	"Program Support"	\$50,000
Colorado Civil Justice League	"Program Support"	\$35,000
Florida Justice Reform Institute	"Program Support"	\$75,000
George Mason University Foundation	"Program Support"	\$160,000

Georgia Chamber of Commerce	"Program Support"	\$10,000
Illinois Civil Justice League	"Program Support"	\$140,000
Lawsuit Reform Alliance of NY	"Program Support"	\$20,000
Lawyers for Civil Justice	"Program Support"	\$140,000
Louisiana Association of Business and Industry	"Program Support"	\$20,000
Mississippians for Economic Progress	"Program Support"	\$10,000
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers	"Program Support"	\$39,435
National Judicial College	"Program Support"	\$20,000
National Foundation for Judicial Excellence	"Program Support"	\$10,000
NJ Lawsuit Reform Alliance	"Program Support"	\$100,000
Pennsylvania Business Council	"Program Support"	\$76,000
Texans for Lawsuit Reform	"Program Support"	\$75,000
Texas Civil Justice League	"Program Support"	\$100,000
University of Denver	"Program Support"	\$20,000
Wisconsin Civil Justice Council	"Program Support"	\$30,000

**CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GROUP:
FORM 990 REPORTED GRANTS/ALLOCATIONS, 2013³³⁰
(Total \$3,037,486)**

RECIPIENT	SPECIFIED PURPOSE	AMOUNT
American Tort Reform Association	"Program Support"	\$1,532,500
Business Council of Alabama	"Program Support"	\$27,500
Citizens to Protect PA Jobs	"Program Support"	\$25,000
Civil Justice Association of California	"Program Support"	\$177,000
Colorado Civil Justice League	"Program Support"	\$65,000
Federalist Society for Law & Public Policy	"Program Support"	\$30,000
Florida Justice Reform Institute	"Program Support"	\$100,000
George Mason University Foundation	"Program Support"	\$197,500
Illinois Civil Justice League	"Program Support"	\$140,000
Lawsuit Reform Alliance of New York	"Program Support"	\$20,000
Lawyers for Civil Justice	"Program Support"	\$240,000
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers	"Program Support"	\$132,986
National Foundation for Judicial Excellence	"Program Support"	\$10,000
National Judicial College	"Program Support"	\$20,000
New Jersey Lawsuit Reform Alliance	"Program Support"	\$120,000
New York Civil Justice Institute	"Program Support"	\$30,000
NFIB Pennsylvania	"Program Support"	\$10,000
Texans for Lawsuit Reform	"Program Support"	\$100,000
University of Denver Institute for the Advancement of American Legal System	"Program Support"	\$60,000

**CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GROUP:
FORM 990 REPORTED GRANTS/ALLOCATIONS, 2014³³¹
(Total \$2,920,000)**

RECIPIENT	SPECIFIED PURPOSE	AMOUNT
American Tort Reform Association	"Program Support"	\$1,657,500
Business Council of Alabama	"Program Support"	\$30,000
Cardozo School of Law	"Program Support"	\$5,000
Citizens to Protect PA Jobs	"Program Support"	\$25,000
Civil Justice Association of California	"Program Support"	\$182,500
Colorado Civil Justice League	"Program Support"	\$50,000
George Mason University Foundation	"Program Support"	\$130,000
Illinois Civil Justice League	"Program Support"	\$150,000
Lawsuit Reform Alliance of New York	"Program Support"	\$15,000
Lawyers for Civil Justice	"Program Support"	\$200,000
Louisiana Association of Business and Industry	"Program Support"	\$15,000
Missouri Chamber Legal Foundation	"Program Support"	\$25,000
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers	"Program Support"	\$55,000
National Judicial College	"Program Support"	\$10,000
New Jersey Civil Justice Institute	"Program Support"	\$110,000
New York Civil Justice Institute Inc.	"Program Support"	\$105,000
South Carolina Business and Industry Political Education Committee	"Program Support"	\$35,000
Texans for Lawsuit Reform	"Program Support"	\$100,000
Wisconsin Civil Justice Council	"Program Support"	\$20,000

**CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GROUP:
FORM 990 REPORTED GRANTS/ALLOCATIONS, 2015³³²
(Total \$2,249,500)**

RECIPIENT	SPECIFIED PURPOSE	AMOUNT
American Tort Reform Association	"Program Support"	\$1,325,500
Civil Justice Association of California	"Program Support"	\$180,000
Colorado Civil Justice League	"Program Support"	\$47,500
George Mason University Foundation Law & Economics Center	"Program Support"	\$35,000
Illinois Chamber of Commerce	"Program Support"	\$10,000
Illinois Civil Justice League	"Program Support"	\$140,000
Justice Consensus Action Network	"Program Support"	\$70,000
Lawsuit Reform Alliance of New York Inc.	"Program Support"	\$36,500
Lawyers for Civil Justice	"Program Support"	\$200,000
Louisiana Association of Business and Industry	"Program Support"	\$15,000
Missouri Chamber Legal Foundation	"Program Support"	\$20,000
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers	"Program Support"	\$20,000

National Judicial College	"Program Support"	\$5,000
South Carolina Business and Industry Political Education Committee	"Program Support"	\$15,000
Texans for Lawsuit Reform	"Program Support"	\$80,000
Washington Legal Foundation	"Program Support"	\$50,000

**CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GROUP:
FORM 990 REPORTED GRANTS/ALLOCATIONS, 2016³³³
(Total \$2,356,281)**

RECIPIENT	SPECIFIED PURPOSE	AMOUNT
American Tort Reform Association	"Program Support"	\$1,315,000
Civil Justice Association of California	"Program Support"	\$225,000
Colorado Civil Justice League	"Program Support"	\$35,000
George Mason University Foundation Law & Economics Center	"Program Support"	\$90,000
Illinois Chamber of Commerce	"Program Support"	\$10,000
Illinois Civil Justice League	"Program Support"	\$150,000
Lawsuit Reform Alliance of New York Inc.	"Program Support"	\$51,500
Lawyers for Civil Justice	"Program Support"	\$215,000
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers	"Program Support"	\$20,000
National Federation of Independent Business – Florida	"Program Support"	\$10,000
National Judicial College	"Program Support"	\$5,000
Pennsylvania Coalition for Civil Justice Reform	"Program Support"	\$124,781
South Carolina Business and Industry Political Education Committee	"Program Support"	\$15,000
Texans for Lawsuit Reform	"Program Support"	\$65,000
Washington Legal Foundation	"Program Support"	\$25,000

**CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GROUP:
FORM 990 REPORTED GRANTS/ALLOCATIONS, 2017³³⁴
(Total \$2,400,400)**

RECIPIENT	SPECIFIED PURPOSE	AMOUNT
American Tort Reform Association	"Program Support"	\$1,287,000
Business and Industry Political Education Committee	"Program Support"	\$15,000
Civil Justice Association of California	"Program Support"	\$190,000
Colorado Civil Justice League	"Program Support"	\$30,000
Federalist Society for Law & Public Policy Studies	"Program Support"	\$40,000
George Mason University Foundation Law & Economics Center	"Program Support"	\$75,000
Georgians for Lawsuit Reform	"Program Support"	\$15,000

Illinois Civil Justice League	"Program Support"	\$135,000
Lawyers for Civil Justice	"Program Support"	\$200,000
Louisiana Association of Business and Industry	"Program Support"	\$25,000
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers	"Program Support"	\$15,000
National Judicial College	"Program Support"	\$10,000
New Jersey Civil Justice Institute	"Program Support"	\$95,000
New York Civil Justice Institute	"Program Support"	\$77,500
Pennsylvania Coalition for Civil Justice Reform	"Program Support"	\$100,900
Texans for Lawsuit Reform	"Program Support"	\$65,000
Washington Legal Foundation	"Program Support"	\$25,000

**CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GROUP:
FORM 990 REPORTED GRANTS/ALLOCATIONS, 2018³³⁵
(Total \$2,213,000)**

RECIPIENT	SPECIFIED PURPOSE	AMOUNT
American Tort Reform Association	"Program Support"	\$1,130,000
Business and Industry Political Education Committee	"Program Support"	\$12,500
Center for Democracy and Technology	"Program Support"	\$20,000
Civil Justice Association of California	"Program Support"	\$180,000
Colorado Civil Justice League	"Program Support"	\$25,000
Due Process Institute	"Program Support"	\$40,000
Georgians for Lawsuit Reform	"Program Support"	\$18,000
Illinois Civil Justice League	"Program Support"	\$135,000
Lawyers for Civil Justice	"Program Support"	\$215,000
Louisiana Association of Business and Industry	"Program Support"	\$25,000
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers	"Program Support"	\$15,000
National Judicial College	"Program Support"	\$10,000
New Jersey Civil Justice Institute	"Program Support"	\$95,000
New York Civil Justice Institute	"Program Support"	\$67,500
Pennsylvania Coalition for Civil Justice Reform	"Program Support"	\$140,000
Texans for Lawsuit Reform	"Program Support"	\$60,000
Washington Legal Foundation	"Program Support"	\$25,000

**CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GROUP:
FORM 990 REPORTED GRANTS/ALLOCATIONS, 2019³³⁶
(Total \$2,440,000)**

RECIPIENT	SPECIFIED PURPOSE	AMOUNT
American Tort Reform Association	"Program Support"	\$1,347,500
Business and Industry Political Education Committee	"Program Support"	\$15,000
Center for Death Penalty Litigation	"Program Support"	\$25,000

Colorado Civil Justice League	"Program Support"	\$45,000
Due Process Institute	"Program Support"	\$50,000
George Mason University Foundation	"Program Support"	\$10,000
Illinois Civil Justice League	"Program Support"	\$135,000
Lawyers for Civil Justice	"Program Support"	\$255,000
Louisiana Association of Business and Industry	"Program Support"	\$15,000
Missouri Civil Justice Reform Coalition Inc.	"Program Support"	\$90,000
National Judicial College	"Program Support"	\$20,000
New Jersey Civil Justice Institute	"Program Support"	\$95,000
New York Civil Justice Institute	"Program Support"	\$67,500
Pennsylvania Coalition for Civil Justice Reform	"Program Support"	\$145,000
Texans for Lawsuit Reform	"Program Support"	\$60,000
U.S. Chamber Litigation Center	"Program Support"	\$40,000
Washington Legal Foundation	"Program Support"	\$25,000

**CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GROUP:
FORM 990 REPORTED GRANTS/ALLOCATIONS, 2020³³⁷
(Total \$2,185,500)**

RECIPIENT	SPECIFIED PURPOSE	AMOUNT
American Tort Reform Association	"Program Support"	\$1,210,500
Chapel and York Foundation	"Program Support"	\$70,000
Colorado Civil Justice League	"Program Support"	\$50,000
Illinois Civil Justice League	"Program Support"	\$135,000
Lawyers for Civil Justice	"Program Support"	\$235,000
Louisiana Association of Business and Industry	"Program Support"	\$25,000
Mississippi Civil Justice Alliance	"Program Support"	\$15,000
Missouri Civil Justice Reform Coalition Inc.	"Program Support"	\$10,000
National Judicial College	"Program Support"	\$20,000
New Jersey Civil Justice Institute	"Program Support"	\$95,000
New York Civil Justice Institute	"Program Support"	\$67,500
Pennsylvania Coalition for Civil Justice Reform	"Program Support"	\$145,000
Texans for Lawsuit Reform	"Program Support"	\$52,500
U.S. Chamber Litigation Center	"Program Support"	\$40,000
Washington Legal Foundation	"Program Support"	\$15,000

**CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GROUP:
FORM 990 REPORTED GRANTS/ALLOCATIONS, 2021³³⁸
(Total \$1,852,500)**

RECIPIENT	SPECIFIED PURPOSE	AMOUNT
American Tort Reform Association	"Program Support"	\$1,017,500

Center for Jurisprudence	"Program Support"	\$25,000
Colorado Civil Justice League	"Program Support"	\$32,500
Due Process Institute	"Program Support"	\$50,000
George Mason University Law & Economics Center	"Program Support"	\$25,000
Illinois Civil Justice League	"Program Support"	\$135,000
Lawyers for Civil Justice	"Program Support"	\$190,000
Missouri Civil Justice Reform Coalition Inc.	"Program Support"	\$60,000
National Judicial College	"Program Support"	\$20,000
New Jersey Civil Justice Institute	"Program Support"	\$85,000
New York Civil Justice Institute	"Program Support"	\$37,500
Pennsylvania Coalition for Civil Justice Reform	"Program Support"	\$120,000
Texans for Lawsuit Reform	"Program Support"	\$40,000
Washington Legal Foundation	"Program Support"	\$15,000

**CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GROUP:
FORM 990 REPORTED GRANTS/ALLOCATIONS, 2022³³⁹
(Total \$1,806,916)**

RECIPIENT	SPECIFIED PURPOSE	AMOUNT
American Tort Reform Association	"Program Support"	\$994,500
Center for Jurisprudence	"Program Support"	\$25,000
Colorado Civil Justice League	"Program Support"	\$32,500
Illinois Civil Justice League	"Program Support"	\$5,416
Illinois Coalition for Legal Reform	"Program Support"	\$100,000
Lawyers for Civil Justice	"Program Support"	\$275,000
Missouri Civil Justice Reform Coalition Inc.	"Program Support"	\$70,000
National Judicial College	"Program Support"	\$15,000
New Jersey Civil Justice Institute	"Program Support"	\$85,000
New York Civil Justice Institute	"Program Support"	\$34,500
Pennsylvania Coalition for Civil Justice Reform	"Program Support"	\$110,000
Texans for Lawsuit Reform	"Program Support"	\$40,000
Washington Legal Foundation	"Program Support"	\$20,000

**CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GROUP:
FORM 990 REPORTED GRANTS/ALLOCATIONS, 2023³⁴⁰
(Total \$1,675,000)**

RECIPIENT	SPECIFIED PURPOSE	AMOUNT
American Tort Reform Association	"Program Support"	\$962,500
ATR Foundation	"Program Support"	\$20,000
Colorado Civil Justice League	"Program Support"	\$35,000
George Mason University Foundation	"Program Support"	\$40,000

Lawyers for Civil Justice	"Program Support"	\$265,000
Missouri Civil Justice Reform Coalition Inc.	"Program Support"	\$50,000
National Judicial College	"Program Support"	\$15,000
New Jersey Civil Justice Institute	"Program Support"	\$90,000
New York Civil Justice Institute	"Program Support"	\$62,500
Pennsylvania Coalition for Civil Justice Reform	"Program Support"	\$85,000
Texans for Lawsuit Reform	"Program Support"	\$35,000
Washington Legal Foundation	"Program Support"	\$15,000

**CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GROUP:
FORM 990 REPORTED GRANTS/ALLOCATIONS, 2024³⁴¹
(Total \$1,871,000)**

RECIPIENT	SPECIFIED PURPOSE	AMOUNT
American Tort Reform Association	"Program Support"	\$927,500
Center for Jurisprudence	"Program Support"	\$20,000
Colorado Civil Justice League	"Program Support"	\$36,000
George Mason University Foundation	"Program Support"	\$150,000
Lawyers for Civil Justice	"Program Support"	\$375,000
Liability Reform Coalition	"Program Support"	\$10,000
Missouri Civil Justice Reform Coalition Inc.	"Program Support"	\$55,000
New Jersey Civil Justice Institute	"Program Support"	\$95,000
New York Civil Justice Institute	"Program Support"	\$42,500
Pennsylvania Coalition for Civil Justice Reform	"Program Support"	\$85,000
Texans for Lawsuit Reform	"Program Support"	\$35,000
Washington Legal Foundation	"Program Support"	\$40,000

NOTES

¹ For more about the differences between these groups, see Internal Revenue Service, *Tax-Exempt Status for Your Organization*, Publication 557 (rev. January 2025), <https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf>

² Based on these criteria, we did not include some formerly prominent “tort reform” groups that seem to have refocused their priorities, such as the Manhattan Institute and Common Good. See Common Good, “A New Governing Vision,” <https://www.commongood.org> (viewed May 20, 2026); Manhattan Institute, “About,” <https://manhattan.institute/about> (viewed May 20, 2026). We also omitted research organizations that may be incorrectly used by “tort reform” groups to support weakening the civil justice system. That includes, for example, the RAND Institute for Civil Justice, whose members connected to insurance companies and the corporate defense bar far outnumber those with plaintiff or consumer/labor ties. See RAND, “RAND Institute for Civil Justice Board of Advisors,” <https://www.rand.org/education-employment-infrastructure/centers/civil-justice/about/board.html> (viewed May 20, 2026). One of their recent reports on “social inflation,” a term the insurance industry uses to complain about juries who rule against them, contained findings that were far more equivocal than the insurance industry probably would have liked, recommending no “tort reforms” and finding that factors external to the civil justice system could be responsible for any litigation growth. RAND, *What Is the Evidence for Social Inflation?* (2024), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA2600/RRA2645-1/RAND_RRA2645-1.pdf

³ For more historical background, see, e.g., Center for Justice & Democracy, “Safeguarding a Pillar of American Freedom – An Historical Primer on the Right to Jury Trial in Civil Cases,” <https://centerjd.org/content/fact-sheet-safeguarding-pillar-american-freedom-historical-primer-right-jury-trial-civil>

⁴ *Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore*, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

⁵ American Tort Reform Association Form 990 (2024), <https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/521464785/202533199349301758/full>

⁶ John Gannon, *Tort Deform - Lethal Bedfellows*. Essential Information (1995).

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ “Proponents of Reform,” *Legal Times*, April 17, 1995, cited in Ken Silverstein, *Smoke & Mirrors: The Tobacco Industry’s Influence on the Phony “Grassroots” Campaign for Liability Limits*, Public Citizen Congress Watch (1996), <https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/smokemirrors.pdf>

⁹ See more, Center for Justice & Democracy and Public Citizen, *The CALA Files: The Secret Campaign by Big Tobacco and Other Major Industries to Take Away Your Rights* (August 2000), <https://centerjd.org/content/cala-files-secret-campaign-big-tobacco-and-other-major-industries-take-away-your-rights>

¹⁰ “Report Says Tobacco Industry Quietly Backed Tort Reform,” *Associated Press*, February 21, 1999. See more, Center for Justice & Democracy and Public Citizen, *The CALA Files: The Secret Campaign by Big Tobacco and Other Major Industries to Take Away Your Rights* (August 2000), <https://centerjd.org/content/cala-files-secret-campaign-big-tobacco-and-other-major-industries-take-away-your-rights>

¹¹ American Tort Reform Association Form 990 (2024), <https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/521464785/202533199349301758/full>. While tax

documents do not list board members' employers, it can be easily discerned that many of the more than two dozen names listed as ATRA Board Members are prominent corporate executives from a variety of industries. For more information, contact the Center for Justice & Democracy.

¹² American Tort Reform Association Form 990 (2024), <https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/521464785/202533199349301758/full>; Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse Inc. Form 990 (2024), <https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/922576020/202503149349301785/full>

¹³ See, e.g., Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse Action FEC Forms 3X: mid-year report 2025, year-end 2025 and April quarterly 2026, <https://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/954/202507299764325954/202507299764325954.pdf>, <https://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/655/202601309794606655/202601309794606655.pdf> and <https://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/688/202604159857527688/202604159857527688.pdf>, respectively; Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse Action Missouri Independent Expenditure Statements: August 13, 21, October 8, 10, 17, November 1, 14 and December 4, 2024, <https://mec.mo.gov/DMS/DOC/V/650691>, <https://mec.mo.gov/DMS/DOC/V/650902>, <https://mec.mo.gov/DMS/DOC/V/652526>, <https://mec.mo.gov/DMS/DOC/V/652440>, <https://mec.mo.gov/DMS/DOC/V/652676>, <https://mec.mo.gov/DMS/DOC/V/653121>, <https://mec.mo.gov/DMS/DOC/V/653570>, and <https://mec.mo.gov/DMS/DOC/V/653935>, respectively; Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse Action Florida Candidate/Committee Contributions: August 10, September 11, 12, 13, October 1, 16, November 14 and December 13, 2024 (summary on file with CJ&D); Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse Action Georgia Campaign Contribution Disclosure Report, October 23, 2024 (on file with CJ&D); Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse Action, "Articles of Incorporation" (2024) (on file with CJ&D).

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¹⁸ Ken Silverstein, *Smoke & Mirrors: The Tobacco Industry's Influence on the Phony "Grassroots" Campaign for Liability Limits*, Public Citizen Congress Watch (1996), <https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/smokemirrors.pdf>

¹⁹ Philip Morris, *Corporate Affairs Corporate Cost Review*, Document ID 2046996735/2046996770 (July 1993), <http://www.pmdocs.com>

²⁰ See Center for Justice & Democracy and Public Citizen, *The CALA Files: The Secret Campaign by Big Tobacco and Other Major Industries to Take Away Your Rights* (August 2000), <https://centerjd.org/content/cala-files-secret-campaign-big-tobacco-and-other-major-industries-take-away-your-rights>

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² On its website, ATRA lists the following CALAs as “partners”: Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse – California, Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse – Florida, Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse – Illinois, Louisiana Lawsuit Abuse Watch, Texans Against Lawsuit Abuse and West Virginia Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse. American Tort Reform Association, “Partners & Programs,” <https://atra.org/partners-programs> (viewed March 31, 2026). Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse Inc.’s 2024 tax filing discusses CALA efforts in California, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Texas and West Virginia. Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse Inc. Form 990 (2024), <https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/922576020/202503149349301785/full>

²³ See Center for Justice & Democracy and Public Citizen, *The CALA Files: The Secret Campaign by Big Tobacco and Other Major Industries to Take Away Your Rights* (August 2000), <https://centerjd.org/content/cala-files-secret-campaign-big-tobacco-and-other-major-industries-take-away-your-rights>

²⁴ For example, on its website, ATRA lists the following coalitions as “partners”: Civil Justice Association of California, Florida Justice Reform Institute, Georgians for Lawsuit Reform, Lawsuit Fairness for Alabama, Lawsuit Reform Alliance of New York, Louisiana Legal Reform Coalition, Michigan Alliance for Legal Reform, Minnesotans for Lawsuit Reform, Missouri Civil Justice Reform Coalition, New Jersey Civil Justice Institute, Ohio Alliance for Civil Justice, Oregon Liability Reform Coalition, Pennsylvania Coalition for Civil Justice Reform, South Carolina Coalition for Lawsuit Reform, Support Legal Reform in Illinois, Texans for Lawsuit Reform, Texas Civil Justice League, Washington Liability Reform Coalition and Wisconsin Civil Justice Council. American Tort Reform Association, “Partners & Programs,” <https://atra.org/partners-programs> (viewed March 31, 2026).

²⁵ Missouri Civil Justice Reform Coalition, “About,” <https://www.mcirc.org/about.html> (viewed April 1, 2026).

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²⁷ Texans for Lawsuit Reform, “TLR at a Glance,” <https://www.tortreform.com/about-tlr> (viewed April 1, 2026).

²⁸ Lone Star Economic Alliance, “Founding Members of Lone Star Economic Alliance Statement on Crucial Lawsuit Reform Legislation,” June 2, 2025, <https://www.lseatx.com/founding-members-of-lone-star-economic-alliance-statement-on-crucial-lawsuit-reform-legislation>

²⁹ See Lone Star Economic Alliance, “About LSEA,” homepage, “News” and “Protecting Texas Businesses from Unfair Litigation,” <https://www.lseatx.com/about>, <https://www.lseatx.com>, <https://www.lseatx.com/blog> and <https://www.lseatx.com/the-issue>, respectively (viewed April 30, 2026).

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³¹ Open Secrets, “Lobbying, Top Spenders,” <https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/top-spenders?cycle=2026> (data as of April 27, 2026).

³² Chamber of Commerce of the USA Form 990 (2024), <https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/530045720/202543179349303374/full>

³³ U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “U.S. Chamber Board of Directors,” <https://www.uschamber.com/about/governance/board-of-directors> (viewed April 24, 2026).

³⁴ ILR was dissolved as a separate corporate entity in 2020, distributing its \$23,481,283 in net assets to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Institute for Legal Reform Form 990, Schedule N (2020), <https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/522109035/202120919349300137/IRS990ScheduleN>. However, the ILR brand, website and advocacy functions have continued without interruption. See U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, <https://instituteforlegalreform.com> (viewed May 25, 2026).

³⁵ This amount includes lobbying by ILR staff as well as outside lobbyists. OpenSecrets, “Client Profile: US Chamber of Commerce,” <https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/clients/lobbyists?cycle=2025&id=D000019798> (data as of April 27, 2026). ILR also had a history of trying to influence state election campaigns, particularly those involving state attorneys general and judges. See, e.g., Center for Justice & Democracy, *The Secret Chamber; The Inner Workings of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Hijacking of an Election* (July 2006), <https://centerjd.org/content/secret-chamber-inner-workings-us-chamber-commerce-and-hijacking-election>. See also, Stephanie Mencimer, “Corporate Enemy #1: State Attorneys General,” *Mother Jones*, December 6, 2007 (“For instance, in 2004, the Chamber went after Democrat Deborah Senn, the former Washington state insurance commissioner who was running for attorney general. Using a dormant nonprofit called the Voter Education Committee, the ILR secretly dumped several million dollars into issue advocacy ads in Washington bashing Senn, who was comfortably ahead in the polls. Oddly enough, the ads accused her of being in the pocket of some of the very insurance companies that were funding the ads; polling data suggested that this would turn voters against her. The characterization wasn’t true: Senn was a Naderite with a strong history of consumer protection. Nonetheless, she lost the election. The state’s Supreme Court later ruled that the Chamber’s ads were illegal because they failed to disclose who paid for them. ‘They spent \$4 million in a race that should have been \$750,000, at most,’ says Senn. ‘It was a devastating loss.’”).

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³⁷ Ibid.

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⁴⁶ American Legislative Exchange Council, “Membership,” <https://alec.org/membership> (viewed May 26, 2026).

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⁴⁸ American Legislative Exchange Council, “Private Enterprise Advisory Council,” <https://alec.org/group/private-enterprise-advisory-council-2> (viewed May 26, 2026).

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⁶³ See chart entitled "Civil Justice Reform Group: Reported Grants/Allocations" in Appendix.

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⁶⁵ Since 2013, Cynthia E. Berry has served in this role at a rate of 40 hours/week without any reported compensation. "Cindi Berry," *LegiStorm*, https://www.legistorm.com/person/bio/86282/Cynthia_Evangeline_Berry.html (viewed April 8, 2026); Civil Justice Reform Group Forms 990 (2013-2024), <https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/800154271>. On her LinkedIn page, Berry describes herself as having "[d]ecades of experience helping Fortune 500 corporations and trade associations achieve their public policy objectives." Cynthia Berry LinkedIn page, <https://www.linkedin.com/in/cynthia-berry-488aa865> (viewed April 8, 2026).

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⁷⁴ See OTHER SPECIAL INTEREST ALLIES; TRUCKING.

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¹²⁹ Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7902–7903 (applying to firearm and ammunition manufacturers, distributors, dealers and importers, with limited exceptions).

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