

Center for Justice & Democracy
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THE TRUTH ABOUT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION
CONTRARY TO POPULAR MYTH, FEW INJURED PATIENTS FILE LAWSUITS.
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES REPRESENT A SMALL NUMBER OF CIVIL CASES CONCLUDED BY TRIAL EACH YEAR.
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES REPRESENT A SMALL NUMBER OF TORT CASES CONCLUDED BY TRIAL EACH YEAR.
THE VAST MAJORITY OF TRUE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES SETTLE.
JURIES ARE COMPETENT AND ABLE TO HANDLE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES.
CONTRARY TO POPULAR NOTIONS, IT IS DIFFICULT FOR PATIENTS TO WIN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES.
PLAINTIFFS WHO HAVE ESTABLISHED LIABILITY AT TRIAL RARELY RECEIVE PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE VERDICTS ARE FAR SMALLER THAN COMMONLY BELIEVED.
COMPENSATION FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IS LESS FREQUENT THAN COMMONLY BELIEVED.
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE VERDICT PAYMENTS ARE FAR SMALLER THAN COMMONLY BELIEVED.
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE VERDICT PAYMENTS COMPENSATE FOR SERIOUS INJURIES.
MEDICAL ERRORS COST OUR NATION BILLIONS OF DOLLARS ANNUALLY.
TOTAL MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION COSTS REMAIN A TINY PERCENTAGE OF OVERALL HEALTH CARE COSTS IN THIS COUNTRY.
FAR FROM BEING “BROKEN,” THE CURRENT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SYSTEM WORKS WELL.
LITIGATION IMPROVES PATIENT SAFETY.
FEAR OF LITIGATION IS NOT THE MAIN REASON DOCTORS DO NOT REPORT ERRORS.
THE BEST WAY TO REDUCE MALPRACTICE LITIGATION IS TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF MALPRACTICE.
Updated June 2010
1 National Academy of Sciences, Institute of Medicine, To Err is Human (1999); Harvard Medical Practice Study (1990).
2 HealthGrades press release, “In-Hospital Deaths From Medical Errors At 195,000 Per Year, HealthGrades Study Finds,” July 27, 2004, found at www.healthgrades.com/media/DMS/pdf/InhosptialDeathsPatientSafetyPressRelease072704.pdf. See also, Testimony of Neil Vidmar, Russell M. Robinson II Professor of Law, Duke Law School, before the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, Hearing on “Medical Liability: New Ideas for Making the System Work Better for Patients,” June 22, 2006 at 5.
3 “Dead By Mistake,” Hearst Newspapers, found at http://www.chron.com/deadbymistake/.
4 David A. Hyman and Charles Silver, “Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort Reform: It’s the Incentives, Stupid,” 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1085, 1089 (May 2006) (citing Brian Ostrom, Neal Kauder & Robert LaFountain, Examining the Work of State Courts, 2003 at 23).
5 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Civil Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 2005,” NCJ 223851 at 2 (Table 2) (October 2008) (revised April 9, 2009), found at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/bjs/cbjtsc05.pdf.
6 Id. at 8, 9 (Table 10).
7 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Tort Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 2005,” NCJ 228129 (November 2009) at 2 (Table 1), found at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/tbjtsc05.pdf.
8 Id. at 12 (Table 12).
9 David M. Studdert et al., “Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation,” 354 N Engl J Med 2024, 2026(2006), found at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/faculty/michelle-mello/files/litigation.pdf.
10 Testimony of Neil Vidmar, supra n.2, at 17. (citations omitted).
11 Id. at 17-18, 22.
12 Id. at 23.
13 Id. at 21.
14 For an extensive list of studies demonstrating the competence of juries, see, e.g., Testimony of Neil Vidmar, supra n.2, at 10 (“The overwhelming number of the judges gave the civil jury high marks for competence, diligence, and seriousness, even in complex cases …Systematic studies of jury responses to experts lead to the conclusion that jurors do not automatically defer to experts and that jurors have a basic understanding of the evidence in malpractice and other cases. Jurors understand that the adversary system produces experts espousing opinions consistent with the side that called them to testify. Moreover, jurors carefully scrutinize and compare the testimony of opposing experts. They make their decisions through collective discussions about the evidence.… We also found that jury awards of prevailing plaintiffs in malpractice cases were correlated with the severity of the injury.”) (citations omitted). See also, Marc Galanter, “Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote,” 55 Md. L. Rev. 1093, 1109, n. 45 (1996), citing Michael J. Saks, Small-Group Decision Making and Complex Information Tasks (1981); Robert MacCoun, “Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us About Decisionmaking by Civil Juries,” in Verdict: Assessing the Civil Jury System 137 (Brookings Institution, Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); Christy A. Visher, “Juror Decision Making: The Importance of Evidence,” 11 Law & Hum. Behav. 1 (1987); Richard O. Lempert, “Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let’s Not Rush to Judgment,” 80 Mich. L. Rev. 68 (1981).
15 Philip G. Peters, Jr., “Doctors & Juries,” 105 U. Mich. L. Rev. 1453, 1454 (May 2007), found at http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/105/7/peters.pdf.
16 “Tort Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 2005,” supra n.7, at 4 (Table 4).
17 Ibid.
18 Id. at 12 (Table 12).
19 “Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation,” supra n.9, at 2026.
20 Valerie P. Hans and Neil Vidmar, American Juries: The Verdict. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books (2007) at 331.
21 Ibid.
22 “Tort Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 2005,” supra n.7, at 7 (Table 6).
23 Id. at 12 (Table 12).
24 Id. at 5 (Table 5).
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Public Citizen’s Congress Watch, Medical Malpractice Payments Fall Again in 2009 (March 2010), at 3, found at http://www.citizen.org/documents/NPDBFinal.pdf. (This report analyzes data in the National Practitioner Data Bank released March 1, 2010.)
28 Id. at 1-2.
29 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Medical Malpractice Insurance Claims in Seven States,” 2000-2004,” NCJ 216339 (March 2007) at 1, found at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mmicss04.pdf.
30 Medical Malpractice Payments Fall Again in 2009, supra n.27, at 4.
31 Id. at 1.
32 Ibid.
33 American Juries, supra n.20, at 333.
34 Id. at 334-335.
35 Id. at 335.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 David A. Hyman et al., “Do Defendants Pay What Juries Award? Post-Verdict Haircuts in Texas Medical Malpractice Cases, 1988–2003,” 4 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 3 (March 2007), found at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=914415.
39 Id. at 3-4.
40 Id. at 4.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Id. at 4, 59.
44 Id. at 4.
45 Medical Malpractice Payments Fall Again in 2009, supra n.27, at 7.
46 Testimony of Neil Vidmar, supra n.2, at 10.
47 Medical Malpractice Payments Fall Again in 2009, supra n.27, at 2.
48 Id. at 1.
49 Ibid.
50 Alexander C. Hart, “Medical malpractice reform savings would be small, report says,” Los Angeles Times, October 10, 2009; http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-malpractice10-2009oct10,0,4877440.story.
51 Pet Food Institute, “U.S. Pet Food Sales,” found at http://www.petfoodinstitute.org/Index.cfm?Page=USPetFoodSales.
52 “Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation,” supra n.9, at 2025, 2031.
53 Id. at 2027-2028.
54 Id. at 2026.
55 Id. at 2030-2031.
56 Id. at 2031.
57 Id. at 2025, 2031.
58 George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H., “The Patient’s Right to Safety – Improving the Quality of Care through Litigation against Hospitals,” New England Journal of Medicine, May 11, 2006.
59 Carol M. Ostrom, “Lawsuit fears aren’t reason for docs’ silence, studies say,” Seattle Times, August 17, 2006, found at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/health/2003204605_apologies17m.html (citing from Thomas Gallagher, M.D. et al, “Choosing your Words Carefully: How Physicians Would Disclose Harmful Medical Errors to Patients,” Archives of Internal Medicine, August 14, 2006).
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 “The Patient’s Right to Safety – Improving the Quality of Care through Litigation against Hospitals,” supra n.58.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Michael D. Greenberg et al., Is Better Patient Safety Associated with Less Malpractice Activity? Evidence from California, Rand Corporation (2010) at x, found at http://rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2010/RAND_TR824.
66 Ibid.
67 Id. at 15.
68 Id. at 15-16.
69 Id. at 19.